Structural Shifts in the Chinese Software Industry by Kshetri, Nir B. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
8 6 I E E E  S O F T W A R E P u b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  I E E E  C o m p u t e r  S o c i e t y 0 7 4 0 - 7 4 5 9 / 0 5 / $ 2 0 . 0 0  ©  2 0 0 5  I E E E
world trade grew from 0.5 to 0.7 percent,
while China’s share rose steeply from 1.8 to
4.0 percent. In 2001, China’s total exports
were $259 billion, compared to India’s $40
billion. China’s fixed-telephone and PC pene-
tration rates are over four times greater than
India’s, and cell phone penetration is over 13
times greater (see table 1). 
Yet China has failed to catch up with India
in one area: commercial software. This indus-
try is very important for developing countries
such as China and India because it can be
started with much less investment than manu-
facturing industries.
The gap between the two countries’ soft-
ware industries is substantial. India’s software
exports exceeded $12 billion in 2003, com-
pared to China’s $2 billion. Global software
industry analysts disagree, however, as to this
gap’s future direction. Some, including the
president of India’s National Association of
Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM),
believe that China lacks the skills and man-
power it needs to catch up in the race.17 An-
other school of thought maintains that China’s
status as a regional and potentially global eco-
nomic superpower and its leadership in the
electronics industry will help to close the gap.
A Gartner Group study, for instance, suggests
that by shifting technological gears, China
could catch up with India in commercial soft-
ware by 2006.18
What will be the magnitude and the direc-
tion of the gap between the two nations’ soft-
ware industries in the future? Given that
China and India account for two-fifths of the
world population and are among the few de-
veloping countries that have established good
track records in exporting high-technology
products, this question is important. While
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China has been working to improve its skill
base, its major competitive disadvantage com-
pared to India, the Chinese software industry
has also been undergoing major structural
shifts in terms of market, participants, tech-
nology, focus, and product. These shifts will
likely have a significant influence on the gap’s
magnitude and direction. Analyses that don’t
consider such factors will likely be too sim-
plistic to make a meaningful prediction.
The structural shifts
As in any economic sector, companies in
the software industry need to realign and
adapt to major technological and market
changes.19 Social, political, and cultural adap-
tations are equally important. Such adaptation
and realignment are tightly linked to a com-
pany’s success. The Indian software industry
doesn’t seem to make efforts to realign and
adapt to technology and market changes. On
the other hand, the Chinese software industry
is undergoing major interrelated structural
shifts in many respects, thanks mainly to gov-
ernment initiatives.
Market shift: Capturing the domestic market
One fundamental structural shift is related
to stimulating domestic demand and orienting
Chinese software firms toward the domestic
market. Estimates of China and India’s domes-
tic software market sizes vary widely. How-
ever, on the basis of related indicators such as
electronic industries and penetration rates of
major technologies including fixed and cellular
telephone lines, PCs, and the Internet (see table
1), we can assume that domestic software de-
mand in China is higher and growing more
quickly than in India. In 2002, the Chinese
business PC software market grew by 20 per-
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Table 1
China and India in terms of major indicators related to the software industry
Indicator China India
Export of software and back-office services (US$ billions) $1.5 (2002)2 $12.5 (Fiscal year 2003–04)*4
$2 (2003)2
$2.5 (2004 estimate)3
Major software export destination Japan, 60% (2004)5 US, 63%
Europe, 24% 
Japan, 3.6% (2002)*4
High-tech exports as a percentage of manufacturing exports6 19 4
PCs per 1,000 people (2000)7,8 28 7
Annual PC sales (millions)9,10 11 (2003) 3 (Fiscal year 2003–04)
Telephone lines (2002, per 1,000 people)11 167 40
Cellular subscribers (2002, per 1,000 people)11 161 12
Internet users (millions, mid 2004)12 87 18.4
Consumer expenditure on hardware (US$ millions, 2003)** 1,004 260
Technology achievement index (maximum possible: 1)13 0.299 0.201
E-government score (2002, out of 100), rank out of 198 countries14 56.3, 7 45.1, 59
Software enterprises (2002) 6,000 + 3,000 +
Average size of software firms (number of employees) 25 174
CMM Level 5 companies (2004)15 2 60
Gross national product per capita in 1980 and 2002 (US$)7,8† 134, 960 262, 470
Total ICT expenditure (US$ billions, 2001)16 66.6 19.6
ICT expenditure as a percentage of the gross domestic product16 5.7 3.9
R&D expenditure as a percentage of the gross domestic product (1996–2002)11 1.1 N/A
Total population (millions, 2002)11 1,294.9 1,049.5
Adult literacy rate (percent, 2002)11 90.9 61.3
Percentage of tertiary students in science, math, and engineering11 53 25
Researchers in R&D per million people (1999–2001)11 584 157
*Software export data are from India’s National Association of Software and Service Companies.
**Calculated from Euromonitor International data.
†The 1980 per capita GDPs are in 1987 US dollars.
cent to reach $2 billion. In the $1 trillion-plus
Chinese economy, the electronics industry ex-
ceeded $130 billion in 2002 (20 percent of the
world market20) and is estimated to reach
$252 billion in 2006. India’s electronics indus-
try, on the other hand, amounted to $12.3 bil-
lion in 2002 and is estimated to reach $35.6
billion in 2010. China is already the world’s
second-biggest PC market and is expected to
become the biggest by 2010.21
Recent institutional changes are stimulat-
ing domestic software demand in China.
China’s new piracy law has increased domes-
tic opportunities for software companies. Esti-
mates suggest that over 92 percent of China’s
software is pirated.22 As a World Trade Orga-
nization member, China is compelled to ad-
here to the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights) agreement. This
agreement requires China to provide adequate
legal and enforcement tools to prevent piracy.
Unlike other new members, China is subject to
an annual review of its WTO obligations for
the first 10 years of its membership. Many
countries will likely put pressure on China to
act on intellectual-property infringement. Un-
der new laws, buyers of pirated goods are
fined and manufacturers will likely face jail
time and equipment confiscation.
More important, Chinese policies are in-
creasingly gravitating toward domestic firms.
Although foreign companies have dominated
China’s domestic software market, domestic
vendors are rapidly capturing the Chinese mar-
ket. In 2003, domestic companies captured 30
percent of the Chinese software market; by
2010, they hope to capture 60 percent.19,23
Government software consumption and re-
cently enacted local procurement laws favor
domestic players. In all developing countries,
the government is the single biggest user of IT
products,24 and the Chinese government is
ahead of other developing-country govern-
ments in adopting modern IT. A significant
part of China’s informatization strategy is the
implementation of e-government programs.
For instance, China ranked seventh among
198 countries in terms of e-government per-
formance in 2002. In terms of IT adoption,
the Chinese government is rated ahead of
global high-tech leaders such as Switzerland,
the UK, Singapore, and Germany.14 Estimates
suggest that the government sector accounts
for 25 percent of the Chinese software market
(www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?
content_id=53682).
The Government Procurement Law, enacted
in January 2003, requires government depart-
ments to procure domestic goods and services
when possible. In early 2002, even before the
law’s existence, six out of seven government
software contracts went to Chinese vendors.
Despite China’s accession to the WTO, gov-
ernment procurement is excluded from the
scope of multilateral trade rules governing the
WTO. So, China isn’t obliged to open its gov-
ernment procurement to foreigners.
Chinese policies are thus geared toward fa-
voring domestic software manufacturers. Fear
of dependence on foreign countries combined
with a sense of national pride resulted in the
principle of national self-reliance under Mao
Tse Tung. Since then, this principle has guided
the Chinese economy. Although attitudes to-
ward technology imports and foreign invest-
ment have changed drastically, a high level of
advocacy for national self-reliance and domestic
technology development still exists among Chi-
nese policy makers, researchers, scientists, and
especially military leaders. For instance, China is
the world’s largest maker of DVD players. By
adopting its own technology, it could save the
$2 billion a year in royalties it pays to an 18-
company consortium.25 China is determined to
achieve self-reliance and reverse the flow of fees
by exporting Chinese standards.
Participant shift: Emergence of new players
On average, Chinese software companies
are much smaller than Indian firms (see table
1). For instance, China’s largest company, Ori-
ental Software, has about 1,300 employees
compared to 26,000 at India’s Infosys and
24,000 at Tata Consulting Systems (TCS).
Over half of China’s software houses have
fewer than 50 employees.26 Typical players in
the Chinese software industry thus suffer from
an absence of management skills and lack of
experience working on sophisticated large-
scale projects.19
An important structural shift in the Chinese
software landscape has been the emergence of
new and powerful players. The Chinese gov-
ernment established Red Flag Linux, backed
by the Chinese Academy of Science, in August
1999. Similarly, the government established
the Beijing Software Industry Production Cen-
ter to organize open source software (OSS) de-










velopment. Building on Red Flag and Cosix
Linux and coordinating the efforts of 100
software engineers across 18 organizations,
the center launched Yangfan Linux in the early
2002. The operating system was installed in
2,800 government computers in Beijing during
the first six months. Yangfan is based on ver-
sions of Linux that Red Flag and the China
Computer Software Corporation developed.
The center also developed office applications
and other Linux-based software. In early
2004, the government selected 29 domestic
firms and is encouraging them to export soft-
ware to the US and Europe.27
Technology shift: Investment in disruptive 
innovation
Another structural shift is the increased em-
phasis on OSS development and deployment.
OSS development was the only software proj-
ect on a list of the government’s top technol-
ogy priorities in 1999. Similarly, Linux Inter-
net server software and Linux mobile phone
software were among the 19 projects that the
Ministry of Information Industry identified in
2004 for the IT Fund, which the State Council
founded in 1986 to encourage IT R&D. The
IT Fund provides grants to high-technology
R&D projects with the potential to foster de-
velopment in areas identified as strategically
important in the Chinese IT industry.
The scale of OSS development and deploy-
ment in China is large enough to notice at the
global level. In the second half of 2003 alone,
Linux sales in the Chinese PC market ex-
ceeded 800,000 copies. At this rate, annual
Linux sales in the Chinese PC market are over
half of the annual PC sales in India (see table
1). In addition to PCs, China’s aircraft,
weapons systems, vehicles, industrial equip-
ment, and consumer devices already use Red
Flag’s Linux applications.25 Thanks to OSS,
the Chinese military has been able to use do-
mestically developed supercomputers. Dawn-
ing, a spinoff from the Chinese Academy of
Sciences, developed the Dawning 4000L, a su-
percomputer with over 3 Tflops per second
computing power. Dawning 4000L is based on
a Chinese-designed Linux OS.
Nearly all major global OSS players, includ-
ing HP, Intel, Sun, Oracle, and IBM have sig-
nificant operations in the Chinese Linux indus-
try. In November 2003, Sun announced a deal
to sell 200 million copies of the Linux-based
Java Desktop System to the government.
Multinational corporations have collaborated
with Chinese partners to get a slice of the ex-
ponentially growing Chinese Linux market.
No other countries come even close to the
level of advancement China has achieved in de-
ploying OSS, particularly Linux. OSS satisfies
several characteristics of a disruptive innova-
tion in the software industry. Despite inferior
initial performance, disruptive innovations are
generally “cheaper, simpler, smaller, and more
convenient to use” than established products
and services in mainstream markets.28 OSS has
experienced initial compatibility problems;
many OSS and Windows applications don’t
work on each other’s platforms, and OSS users
often encounter compatibility issues with their
business partners’ standards or client needs.
However, OSS has a lower initial cost, slower
obsolescence of basic infrastructure features,
and thus a lower total cost of ownership. Its
amenability to modification makes localized
customization easier. OSS communities provide
supportive environments for transition. OSS
has high levels of compatibility and portability
for old and used hardware.29 These disruptive
characteristics will likely establish an entirely
new performance trajectory for OSS.
Disruptive innovations either create new
markets by targeting nonconsumers or com-
pete in the low end of an established market.
Given limited computerization in developing
countries, most firms and individuals are cur-
rently nonconsumers of software. Developing
countries have historically been locked out of
high-tech industries because they lacked skills
and wealth. The demand for software in these
markets is typically small and hence unattrac-
tive to large companies such as Microsoft,
IBM, Oracle, and SAP.
Open source software’s disruptive charac-
teristics will likely make it attractive for devel-
oping countries. As with other disruptive in-
novations, the incumbents (for example,
Indian software firms and software giants
from developed countries) might lack the abil-
ity to play in the new game in the field of
OSS.28 What’s more, by creating new con-
sumption and improving the available offer-
ings, innovators might also attract incum-
bents’ customers. So, China’s competitive edge
in OSS will likely result in Chinese firms’
emergence as a powerful threat to incumbents
in the global software industry.


















Focus shift: Collaboration and concentration
on core competence
Chinese companies have collaborated with
multinational corporations and governments
in other Asian economies on various software
projects. Such collaboration promotes synergy
and lets Chinese firms focus on core compe-
tence. For instance, Red Flag has collaborated
with
■ TurboLinux to introduce Chinese-lan-
guage versions of Linux;
■ Miracle Linux to develop Linux versions
of Oracle’s database software and
Asianux (a just-for-Asia Linux);
■ HP to port HP’s Integrity and Proliant
servers to Red Flag Linux;
■ the US company LinuxLab to develop and
market software;
■ Eforce, Culturecom, and Mobile Telecom
to develop the Chinese 2000 Mobile
Linux Operating System for handheld de-
vices; and
■ Oracle to develop Red Flag Data Center
OS4.0.
Similarly, the Chinese Academy of Science’s
Chinese Software Institute launched Hongqi
Linux, an all-Chinese operating system, and
collaborated with Compaq for developing ap-
plication solutions in August 1999. The insti-
tute also launched Chinese Penguin64 with Sin-
gapore’s Donovan Systems in 2000. Likewise,
Motorola collaborated with Lineo, which de-
veloped embedded Linux, and Caldera, which
provides Linux for commercial applications.
IBM has an alliance with Kingsoft, China’s
biggest office-automation software vendor, to
develop desktop Linux applications. Red Flag is
also working with companies such as HP to de-
velop OSS products for international markets.
China has also identified regional economies
with similar missions and collaborated with
their governments and technology firms on nu-
merous software projects. The Japan-China-
Korea (JCK) open source alliance, announced
in November 2003, is an initiative to promote
OSS by co-sourcing. The Japanese IT Services
Industry Association, the Chinese Software In-
dustry Association, and the Federation of Ko-
rean Information Industries are guiding the
JCK alliance. The three associations have over
1,000 corporations as members, including
nearly all major players in the Japanese and
Korean IT industries. The JCK partnership is
working on open source business models, stan-
dardizing software, and training software en-
gineers. There has been a division of labor in
the partnership: China will develop PC oper-
ating systems, Japan will focus on software
development and security, and Korea will de-
velop software for PDAs.30 The partnership is
setting up a database to coordinate efforts and
avoid duplication.
Product shift: Bundling with hardware and
software
As I noted earlier, China’s high-tech sector
is far ahead of India’s and has a wider global
presence. High-tech products accounted for
19 percent of China’s manufactured exports in
2001, compared to India’s four percent (see
table 1). In 2001, China exported over $24
billion in IT hardware, compared to India’s $1
billion.31 China’s high-tech exports grew by
25.4 percent in 2001 to reach $46.5 billion.32
China can capitalize on its leadership in the
electronics industry and collaboration with
global software giants to add value by
bundling its software with hardware and soft-
ware manufactured by foreign companies.
Given that devices from cars to coffee pots
and supercomputers to cell phones use OSS,
adding value by bundling seems promising for
the Chinese software industry.
Bundling with cell phones. Consider the Chi-
nese third generation (3G) mobile standard
Time Division-Synchronous Code Division
Multiple Access. TD-SCDMA is the only 
International Telecommunications Union-
approved 3G standard of the Time Division
Duplex mode and uses the 3G frequencies that
the ITU allocated to TDD. TD-SCDMA is
more suited than competing standards for use
in the dense cities common in developing
countries. Estimates suggest that it will cap-
ture a significant share of the global market
following its launch in 2005.33 In July 2004,
Datang Telecom Technology, the intellectual-
property owner of TD-SCDMA, confirmed
that it had selected Linux as its 3G handset’s
operating system.
Bundling with PCs. The Chinese desktop PC in-
dustry is more advanced than those in other de-
veloping countries. According to the IDC’s 2003
Chinese PC market report, the Chinese com-
pany Legend is the leader in the Chinese desktop
PC market, with a market share of 27.8 percent
in 2002.34 Legend’s subsidiary is already selling
motherboards and other hardware and acces-
sories in Europe and Asia. In the long term, the
company aspires to become international and
aims to increase its out-of-China sales to 30 per-
cent of total sales by 2006.34 Some players from
emerging economies are selling PCs that use
open source operating systems and applications.
For example, LG, a Korean multinational cor-
poration, has successfully employed such a
strategy. LG is exporting Pentium 4 PCs to India
that are low-priced because they use Red Hat 8
Linux. This low price has boosted demand for
LG’s PCs in India.
Bundling with other software. Bundling Chi-
nese software with that of multinational cor-
porations benefits both parties. The success of
a complementary program that runs on OSS,
such as Linux, will boost demand for some
technology products, and multinational cor-
porations’ expertise in such products boosts
demand for their offerings.35 Such bundling
has already occurred for the domestic market.
For instance, IBM signed a marketing agree-
ment with Red Flag to bundle IBM DB2 Ex-
press Database software with Red Flag Linux
for use by small and medium-sized businesses.
Overcoming the competitive
disadvantage
China is also finding ways to overcome its
competitive disadvantage by removing the
skill bottleneck. Despite a lack of human re-
sources and competence in the software sector,
China is ahead of India in terms of basic indi-
cators such as the concentration of researchers
in R&D, proportion of tertiary students in
math and engineering, and literacy rate (see
table 1). In addition, the Chinese government
has formulated policies to attract Chinese sci-
ence and technical workers living abroad and
use them as a national competitive advantage.
Among foreign-born scientists and engineers
working in the US, more originate from China
than any other country. Thanks to increased
domestic opportunities, a higher proportion of
Chinese engineers trained in advanced coun-
tries are returning to China. For instance, an
estimated 75 percent of Chinese engineering
students who graduate in the US return to
China, compared to 25 percent in the past.36
In terms of linguistic skills, China has a
large population with good command of
Asian languages such as Japanese and Korean.
They can overcome poor English with training
and experience.37 Students in Chinese schools
learn English, and college students must pass
English proficiency exams to graduate. In
2002, 20 million people were undergoing Eng-
lish language training in China.
To combat a lack of high-level international
quality certification, such as higher CMM lev-
els. China is also attempting to enhance its
technological skills. For instance, the Chinese
government is providing incentives for soft-
ware firms that attain CMM Level 3 or
higher.26 Likewise, in an attempt to improve
the OSS skill base, China has recently made
OSS a required course in 35 universities and
35 prevocational schools.
Where is the future leading?
As we’ve seen, the magnitude and direction
of the future gap between China and India’s
software industries are functions of OSS’s de-
gree of disruptiveness, the success of collabo-
rative efforts with multinational corporations
and at the regional level, China’s capability to
develop the domestic technological base (for
example, TD-SCDMA’s success), the Chinese
electronics industry’s international perform-
ance, and the Chinese software market’s do-
mestic growth.
Attacking competitors’ markets
China and India’s major software destina-
tions are related to cultural distance. The US
and the UK are India’s major markets, thanks
to its English language competence (see tables 1
and 2). On the other hand, China’s cultural
similarity to Japan and South Korea has facili-
tated its software export. Hong Kong-based en-
terprises are also outsourcing software to main-
land China because of geographic proximity
and political links. Although small, Japan is
much safer than the EU and US for Chinese
software firms. China’s engagement in regional
collaborations such as the JCK initiatives will
likely facilitate better customer relationships
and further strengthen the market.
Compared to Indian software giants such
as Infosys and TCS, Chinese companies are
smaller and less known in the global market.
Language and cultural barriers compound the
problem for Chinese firms in the US and EU
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markets. As I mentioned earlier, only a few
government-selected firms are focusing on the
US and EU markets.
Although China, according to an IDC
study, is the fourth-favorite software-out-
sourcing location for US companies after In-
dia, Canada, and Ireland,27 software sales
from Chinese firms to the US market are only
a fraction of Indian firms’ sales. In 2003, only
18 percent of China’s software-outsourcing
sales came from the US.27 Chinese companies
are focusing on US-invested companies in
China rather than directly competing with In-
dian firms.27 Nevertheless, because the US and
EU are major buyers of China’s hardware, the
structural shifts I discussed earlier (for exam-
ple, bundling) can facilitate software’s pene-
tration in these economies.
Developing countries’ markets
The software market is growing fast in de-
veloping countries. Although Indian software
firms export to over 95 countries, less than 10
percent of those exports go to countries out-
side the US, the EU, and Japan (see tables 1
and 2). India thus has a limited presence in de-
veloping countries. China’s electronics exports
to developing countries and increased
bundling with hardware will help boost
China’s commercial software growth. More-
over, almost all major developing countries in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America are rapidly
gravitating towards OSS and have high-profile
national OSS projects. They’re thus likely to
favor open source over proprietary software.
OSS’s lower total cost of ownership combined
with China’s increasing dominance in the
global IT industry, therefore, will let China
significantly alter the dynamics of its competi-
tion with India.
I ndia has outperformed China in terms ofskill base and has an established trackrecord and a solid customer base. For in-
stance, over one-fifth of Fortune 1,000 com-
panies outsource their software requirements
to India. Moreover, the US and the EU, India’s
major software destinations, have much
higher software demand than Japan, China’s
major software destination (see table 2).
However, unlike India’s one-dimensional de-
velopment that focuses solely on the skill base
(for example, the number of CMM Level 5
Table 2
Market sizes of China and India’s major software destinations*
Country Software category Market size** (2002) Remarks
USA Business PCs 8,402.9 The US is the world’s largest software market and accounted for half 
the world’s software sales in the past decade. Moreover, American IT 
and financial services companies have geared up much faster than their 
European counterparts to exploit offshore programming’s advantages. 
Chinese firms are rapidly making inroads to the US.
Networking 3,932.0
Home, leisure, and entertainment PCs 4,500.2
Multimedia 6,501.0
Prerecorded music and video 34,515.5
UK Business PCs 1,640.0 Among Western European countries, the UK is India’s largest software 
destination. India’s former colonization by Great Britain and Indians’ 
English language advantage facilitate software demand from the UK.
Networking 820.5
Home, leisure, and entertainment PCs 595.6
Multimedia 608.0
Prerecorded music and video 3,407.9
Japan Business PCs 6,000.0 Language and cultural barriers are hindering the growth of India’s 
exports to Japan.
South Korea Business PCs 218.0
*Source: Various Euromonitor International publications (www.euromonitor.com).
**All figures are in US$ millions except those for the UK, which are in millions of English pounds.
companies and the size of the technical-
manpower pool), China has been undergoing
major structural changes and multidimensional
development. The structural shifts could dra-
matically reshape the Chinese software industry
and change the competitive landscape.
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